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[L. A. No. 18121. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1944.] 
UNIVERSAL CONSOLIDATED OIL COMPANY (a Cor-
poration), Respondent, v. H. L. BYR.A.M, as County 
Tax Collector, etc., Appellant. 
[L. A. No. 18122. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1944.] 
LONG BEACH HARBOR OIL COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Respondent, v. H. L. BYRAM, as County Tax Collector, 
etc., Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Taxation - Equaliz&tion - Proceedinp of Local Boards- . 
PresumptioDB.-In actions to enjoin collection of taxes and for 
revaluation of oil lease!! for taxation purposes, evidence that 
one member of the county board of equalization did not par-
ticipate at the final meeting, that two other members expressed 
the mistaken view that plaintifts' application for reduction of 
the valuations raised legal rather than factual issues, and that 
the two remaining members failed to deny incorrect statements 
made incident to an adverse ruling on the applications, over-
came the presumption that the board performed its ofllcial 
duty to equalize the valuation of taxable property in the county. 
[2] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Decision-
Majority of Board.-In a proceeding before a board of equali-
zation for reduction of the valuations placed on certain oil 
leases, a determination by two rather than by three qualified 
members of the board did not satisfy the statutory require-
ment that at least a majority of tbe board must act on tbe 
evidence presented. 
[8] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Decision.-
In a proceeding before a board of equalization for reduction of 
the valuations placed on certain oil leases, the taxPayers' con-
stitutional right to a hearing comprehended a decision in the 
light of the evidence there introduced before any determination 
became flnal as to them. 
[4] Id.-EClualization-ProceedJDgs of Local Boards-Nature of 
Proceedinl8.-The equalization stage of a tax proceeding is no 
exception to tbe rule that a tax· proceeding is .. ,,",if,,,,, in 
[3] See 24 Oa1.Jur. 242. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 207; [2, 3] Taxation, 
§ 203; [4) Taxation, § 195: [5] Taxation, § 200; [8] Taxaticm, 
,205; [7J Taxation, § 208; [8] Taxation, 1196. 
II c.M-U 
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DAture and .hat each step must be taken in compliance with 
law or the proceeding is void. 
[5] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Loca.1 Boards-Rearing.-
Compliance with theconstitutionaJ requirement for an equali-
zation hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the 
form of the hearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer. 
[6] Id.-Equalization-Proeeedings of Local Boards-Oonclusive-
ness of Action.-A county board of equalization is the fact-
finding body designated by law to remedy excessive assess-
ments, and when that tribunal, after due hearing and within 
the limits of reasonable discretion, makes its findings on the 
facts, such decision is final and conclusive. 
. [7a, 7b] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Beview. 
-In actions to enjoin the collection of taxes and for revalu-
ation of oil leases for taxation purposes, while the absence of 
an adjudication by the county board of equalization as to the 
facts in issue and a failure to consider the evidence or the 
merits of the objections raised amounted to a lack of pro-
cedural due process, authorizing the court to nullify the board's 
'ruling, the intent of the law governing equalization proceed-
ings required that the cases be remanded to the board for 
completion on the basis of the evidence submitted at the hear-
ing before it. (Bandini Estate 00. v. Los Aftgeus OOtlMfy, 28 
C.A.2d 224, 82 P.2d 185, disapproved in part.) 
(8] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Meetiqs of 
Board-Time for.-While the right of a board of equalization 
is limited by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1603, that provision is di-
rectory only and d()es not deflect from the statutory scheme 
that the authorized tribunal passon matters properly within 
its jurisdiction, though in the completion of its work it must 
act at a time beyond the prescribed period. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Caryl M. Sheldon, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Actions to enjoin collection of taxes and for revaluation of 
oil leases for taxation purposes. Judgments for plaintiffs 
reversed with directions. 
J.B. O'Connor, County Counsel, S. V. O. Prieh&rd, A&-
sistant County Counsel, and A. Curtis Smith and Gordon 
Boller, Deputies County Counsel, for Appellant. 
Faries & McDowell, Holbl'OQk & Tarr, C. E. McDowell 
aDd W. Sumner Bolbrook, Jr., for Bespondenta. 
) 
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CURTIS, J . ...-Universal Consolidated on Company and 
Long Beach Harbor Oil Company duly filed with the Board 
of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, sitting as the 
board of equalization for said county, applications for reduc-
tion of the valuations placed by the assessor for the year 
1940-1941 upon certain of their oil leases in the Long Beach 
Harbor-Wilmington Field. The applications were denied by 
the board, and the oil companies thereupon commenced these 
actions to enjoin collection of the taxes and to bave the court 
revalue the leasehold interests for assesment purposes. As 
the premise of their respective claims to relief. the plaintiffs 
charged that the particular method of assessment used in re-
lation to their leases 'produced valuations which were unfair, 
unjust and excessive as compared with other property hold-
ings of substantially the same character and value and simi-
larly situated in the county. and 80 imposed an unequal 
burden upon the complainants; that the clear purport of the 
testimony presented at the hearing before the board estab-
lished these matters as proper eases for equalization, but that 
the board, in its summary denial of the applications for re-
duction, intentionally failed and refused to consider the evi-
dence before it and. in disregard thereof, expressly. deliber-
ately, and wilfully withheld decision of the questions of fact 
in issue; and that their constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection of the laws have thereby been invaded.' 
In their individual complaint.A the plaintiff!'! also recited their 
tender to the tax collector. and hil'! rejection. of certain 
amounts which they estimated as properly representative of 
the taxes due for the year in question under a fail' valuation 
of their leases. and such sums. together with the respective 
balances purportedly owing upon the basiR of the &8I'IesRed 
values, were deposited in cOurt as a condition to the issuance 
of temporary injunctions in restraint of the collection of the 
challenged taxeS pending the final determination of these 
matters. (County of LoR Att.geZu v.Ballentt.O. 99 Cal. 593. 
597 [32 P. 581, 34 P. 3291: County of Los Att.geles v. Ramo-
hoff, 24 Cal.App.2d 238. 245 f74 P.2<1 8281.) The-defendant 
tax collector in hi!'!' respective answel'R denied the material 
charges of the complainti'! as to the mega.1itv of the method 
of computing the taxes in qUeRtion and the failure of the board 
to determine the points in controversy upon the merits. 
The actions were ("onsolMated for tria.], lind toere was intro-
duced in evidence the applications for reduced valuations as 
856 UNIVBII8AL CoNS. On. Co. fl. BYlWI 
mentioned, the reporter'. transeript of the testimony at the 
hearing before the board, and certain exhibits there presented. 
In addition, further evidence was introduced, over the objec-
tion of the defendant, as to the ~r'. method of assess-
ment of the leases in question and' as to the relative value of 
the plaintiifs' and adjacent leasehOld interests. It was stipu-
lated at the trial that it was the general method of assessment 
in Los .Angeles County in 1940 to assees leasehold interests 
as here involved "at not to exceed 50 Pel" cent of their market 
value." Counsel for the parties &lao agreed by stipulation as 
to the then prevailing tax rate for such property holdinp. 
After a full hearing in these eases, the trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiJfs on all material issues In dispute and 
made considerable reductions In the ehallenged valuations. 
The taxes on the leasehold interests were then computed at 
the stipulated rate, and the clerk of the court, from the moneys 
previously deposited with him by the plaintiffs, was directed 
to pay the amounts 10 ealculated as a full discharge of the 
disputed tax claims and to refund to the plaintiffs the re-
spective segregable balances remaining. From the separate 
judgments 80 entered in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant 
has appealed. .As heretofore consolidated, the cast8 are pre-
sented on appeal upon one record and involve identical 
questions. 
. The principal point in controversy between the parties con-
cerns the propriety of the plaintiifs' recourse to the court· for 
relief from the adverse determination of the county bc.rd 
of equalization. It must be conceded, of eourse, that it is 
well settled in this state that to the authorized county board 
of equalization has been confided the duty of determining 
"the value of the property under consideration for assess-
ment purposes upon such basis as is used in regard to other 
property, sO as to make all the assessments as equal and fair 
as is practicable"; that in discharging this duty, "the board 
is exercising judicial functions, and its decision as to the 
value of the property and the fairness of the _SuBlent so . 
far as amount is concerned constitutes an independent and 
conclusive judgment of the tribunal ereated by law for the 
determination of that question," adjudicating necessarily 
that "the property is assessed at the same value proportion-
ately as all the other property in the county"; that such 
adjudication "cannot be avoided unless the board has pro-
) 
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ceeded arbitrarily and in willful disregard of the law intended 
for their guidance and control, with the evident purpose of 
imposing unequal burdens upon certain of the taxpayers' 
• • . or unles there be something equivalent to fraud in the 
action of the board"; and that "Mere errors in honest judg-
ment as to the value of the property will not obviate the bind-
ing effect of the conclusion of the board." (Los AngeZes etc. 
CO. V. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 169-170 [121 P. 
384, 9 A.L.R. 1277]; see, also, Southern Pac. Land CO. V. San 
Diego County, 183 Cal. 543, 546 [191 P. 931]; Birch v. County 
of Orange, 1860a1. 736, 741 [200 P. 647]; Wild Goose Coun-
try Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 339, 342 [212 P. 
711]; Merchants Trust CO. V. HopkifU, 103 Cal.App. 473, 
477-478 [284 P. 1072]; Montgomery Ward ct Co. v. Welch, 17 
Ca1.App.2d 127, 132 [61 P.2d 790]; Southern Cal. Tel. CO. V. 
Los Angeles County, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 116-117 [113 P.2d 
773].) While not classifiable with any aspect of fraud or bad 
faith, the lack of due process distinguishing the procedural 
phase of these equalization matters as submitted to the board 
furnishes an equally appropriate basis for the court's inter-
vention in protection of the plainti1fs' constitutional rights. 
From the transcript of the proceedings before the board, 
which was in evidence at the trial, it appears that on July 18, 
1940, testimony in these eases was presented before three 
members: Supervisors Jessup, Hauge and McDonough; that 
at the termination of the oral hearing the matters were taken 
under advisement; and that a final ruling on the applications 
was made on August 1, 1940, at a formal meeting of the board, 
when, in addition to the above-named members, Supervisors 
Ford and Smith were also present, neither of whom had at-
tended the previous hearing nor heard the testimony. Two 
other applications were before the board at the same time for 
disposition; namely, those of Signal Oil & Gas Company, No. 
268, and Long Beach Oil Development Company, No. 269. 
At this final meeting, when neither the complainants nor their 
counsel were present, the following colloquy incident to the 
denial of the applications in question took place: 
"Chairman Jessup: Signal Oil & Gas Company, No. 268, 
and Long Beach Oil Development Company, No. 269. Mr. 
McDonough: This is a possessory interest! Mr. Ford: I was 
not in on this. Mr. Smith: 1-2 and 5. Mr. McDonough: This 
ja iD. the same situation as Signal.. Mr. Smith; Y •. <Mr. Me-
) 
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Donough: They are both alike. Mr. Smith: Signal Oil & Gas 
Company and the Universal Oil Company and Long Beach 
Oil Company. Mr. McDonough: There is a legal question in-
volved here. Mr. Smith: I think they appeared only to protect 
their rights in court and made very little showing and I think 
we should deny it. Mr. McDonough: Well, I still think we 
should have an opinion of the County Counsel attached to 
the application for the advice of the Board and also in the 
event it is pursued in court. Mr. Smith: It is in court right 
now. Mr. McDonough: Let's set it aside for a moment. Mr. 
Smith: I made a statement during the hearing. • . • 
"Chairman Jessup: Now, on the Signal Oil & Gas Com-
pany, No. 268. Long Beach Oil Development Company, No. 
269, Universal Oil Company, No. 1020, and Long Beach 
Harbor Oil Company, No. 1021. Mr. McDonough: Mr. Boller 
[Deputy County Counsel] is here. Mr. Boller: Yes. Mr. 
McDonough: Now, these oil applications that we heard, they 
indicated that the application!l show a contractor's lease with 
the land owners for the purpose of drilling of wells. Mr. 
Boller : Yes, on Signal Oil & Gas and Long Beach Oil Devel-
opment Company. Mr. Smith: Universal and Long Beach 
Harbor Oil Company were similar. Mr. Boller: I think the 
two were the only ones Mr. Holmes handled. Mr. McDonough: 
Holmes appeared for-- Mr. Boller: For Signal Oil & Gas 
Company and the Long Beach Oil Development Company. Mr. 
Smith: Didn't you make a statement at the time of the hear-
ing that they were here appearing in regard to protecting 
their rights' Mr. Boller: That was as to the Signal Oil & Gas 
and the Long Beach Oil Development Company only. Mr. 
Smith: The other two would be the same. Mr. Boller: There 
is no question but what that is so on the two cases Mr. Holmes 
presented. Mr. Smith: I move that the Long Beach Oil De-
velopment Company-- Mr. McDonough: Wait a minute, 
I want to ask Mr. Boller would it help the case any if it was 
referred to the County Counsel. Mr. Boller: No. Mr. Smith: 
Move that it be denied. Mr. Boller: On the Long Beach Oil 
Development Company the application was for cancellation 
and was heard in the same hearing and is to be acted upon by 
the Board of Supervisors. Mr. McDonough: That is another 
application on a case coming to us. Mr. Boller: You have an-
swered on that. Mr. Smith: I move that the Si!!nn] Oil & Gas 
Company be denied. Chairman Jessup; So ordered. Mr. 
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Smith: I move that the Long Beach Harbor· Oil Company be 
denied and Universal Oil Company No. 1020 be denied. Chair-
man Jessup: So ordered. Mr. Smith: That these four be de-
nied. Chairman Jessup: So ordered. Mr. McDonough: On 
these matters it is a legal question to be determined by the 
Court rather than a matter of equalization. Mr. Boller: It is 
essentially so in the Signal Oil & Gas Company and the Long 
Beach Oil Development Company cases. It seems to me the 
others were factual in their showing. Mr. Smith: It is the 
same thing, they have a lease and are being assessed on their 
interests. They have a contract and are being assessed as 
though it were a lease. They are protecting their interest and 
in case the Long Beach Oil Development Company and the 
other one should win in court, these people are in the same 
position. Mr. Boller: Their agreement is not as carefully 
drawn up with· the thought of not being taxable as a lease. 
Mr. Smith: Yes, the resume they attach is exactly the same. 
Mr. Boller: I didn't look at them. Mr. McDonough: The basis 
is the determination of a Zegalquestion rather than an appeal 
on a question of equalization. Mr. Boller: It is 80 as to Signal 
and the Long Beach Oil Development Company." (Italics 
added.) 
[la] From this quoted portion of the record of the board 
proceedings, it is clear that two members (McDonough and 
Smith), one of whom had neither heard nor been advised as 
to the evidence adduced with regard to the two matters here 
in question, expressed their distinct understanding that they 
were passing upon four applications which presented wholly 
a point of law to be settled by the court rather than matters 
of equalization. Despite the advice of the deputy county 
counsel herein concerned that the plaintiffs' applications 
raised factual issues before the board, the said mcmbers ad-
hered to the belief that all four oil companies were urging 
like objections to the assessed valuations of their respective 
properties and that if the complainants Signal Oil & Gas Com-
pany and Long Beach Oil Development Company should pre-
vail in court upon the legal proposition which they advanced 
in their equalization hearing, the plaintiffs also would be 
sustained upon the same premise, which apparently rested on 
the claim that the particular form of contract employed would 
render them entirely exempt from taxation on their holdings. 
No such argument had ever been made by the plaintiffs; 
) 
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rather, they had conceded from the outset that their leasehold 
interests were taxable, query simply having been raised 88 to 
the legality of the method of assessment followed in their cases. 
The' plaintiffs had not been notified that their applications 
were to be considered at this final meeting, their counsel ac.· 
cordingly were not present, and they had no opportunity to 
clarify the evident confusion in the minds of the board mem-
bers as to the issues involved. While three of the 'board 
members, 88 above noted, had heard extentive testimony 88 
to valuation bases with respect to the plaintiffs' leases, ap-
parently at the subsequent formal meeting of the board they 
did not correlate. this prior hearing of factual evidence with 
the plaintiffs' applications. Thus, at the final meeting Super-
visor Ford did not participate; Supervisors Smith and Mc-
Donough expressed their mistaken views 88 above recited; 
and Supervisors Jessup and Hauge, in failing to deny any 
of the incorrect statements made incident to the adverse rul-
ing upon the plaintiffs' applications, manifestly acquiesced 
therein upon the same erroneous premise. Such affirmative 
showing in 'the record that the board acted without regard 
for the evidence before it overcomes the presumption that it 
performed its official duty "~ equalize the valuation of tu-
able property in the county." (HumboldfCounty v. Dins-
more, 75 Cal. 604, 607-608 [17 P. 710]; Hagenmeyer v. Board 
of Eq'lUilizafion, 82 Cal. 214, 218 [23 P. 14]; Rancho Santa 
Marnarita v. San Diego County, 185 Cal.App. 134, 143 [26 
P.2d 716].) [a] But even if it were reasonable to assume 
that the silence of Supervisors Jessup and Hauge at the final 
meeting on these matters did not demonstrate their acquies-
cence in the confused views of their associates but that, on 
the contrary, they, as tbe result of attendance at the iirst 
hearing, had the character of the plaintiffs' applications 
iinnly . in mind when they joined in the adverse decision· 
thereon, still such determination by two rather than three 
qualified members (McDonough, Jessup and Hauge) of the 
tribunal authorized to equalize assessments would not satisfy 
the statutory requirement that atleast a maiority of the board 
must act upon the evidence presented. (Ban.dini Estate Co. 
v. Los Angeles Count!l, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 229-230[82 P.2d 
185].) 
[3] The fnnonmrn1rt pr<>mise of the plnilltiff's recourse 
to the court for relief rests upon the proposition that, as with 
) 
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any ad valorem tax, their constitutional right to an equaliza-
tion hearing comprehends a decision i,.. 1M Zigh.1 of 1M ."'-
dencB there introduced before any determination becomes 
final as to them. (Bandini Estat. Co. v. Lo, AngeZu County, 
supra, at p. 230; Lon.doner v. Dent1.r, 210 U.S. 373, 386 [28 
S.Ot. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103].) [4] As any tax proceeding is 
in invitum in nature, each step must be taken in compliance 
with law or the proceeding is void. The equalization stage is 
no exception to this rule. [5] Compliance with theconsti-
tutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met 
unless the substance as well as the form of the hearing is 
granted to the cOmplaining taxpayer. (Bondini Estat. Co. 
v. Los Angeles Oounty, supra, at p. 227.) Typiea1 illustrations 
of the denial of procedural due process which have been held 
to invalidate purported equalization detenninations are: One 
man hearings (Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angele. County. 
supra, at pp. 228-230): the taking of evidence without the 
presence of the taxpayer or his representative (Car"'" v. 
Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572. 577 [158 P. 2181; BGftdini lCstat. 00. 
·v. Los Angel.s Oounty, supra, at p. 231); the refusal to allow 
reasonable opportunity for cross-examination (Int.rstate Oom-
merc. Com.v. Louisvt1le tt Nash.. R.R., 227 U.S. 88. 93 f33 
S.Ot. 185. 57 L.Ed. 4311): the refusal to permit reasonable 
argument (Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 37S. 386 [28 S.Ot. 
708, 52 L.Ed. 1103]); reliance in the concluding steps upon 
the advice of the assessor 01' the assessor's attorney, particu-
larly if done secretly (Morgan v. United Stat". 304 U.S. 1, 
19-20 [58 S.Ct. 773. 82 L.Ed. 1129]) : and the attempted de-
termination of a case by members of the board who did not 
hear the evidence. if their vote be necessary to the determina-
tion (Hawkins v. Gd. Rapids Common Council. 192 Mich. 
276. 291-292 rt58 N.W. 953. \Ann.Cas.1917E 700]). 
[ib] In line with these instances of the denial of proce-
dural due proCesR are the present eases. The c:oncZuding "ep. 
of the equalization proceeding are Jnany times the most essen-
tial to tht' preservlttion of the taxpayer'R rights. Thus. in 
Morgan v. TTnited States. supra, it IS pertinently said in this 
regard (304 U.S. 20): "The requirements of fairness are 
not exhausted in the taking or consideration of evidence but 
extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as well 18 to 
the beginning ann intermediate .steps." (Italies added.) Ad-
verting to the aho\-e recited conduct of the board at its 
final meeting with respect to the plaintiffa' applieatiODS, it is 
) 
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plain that there was no adjudication 4$ to tke facts in issue 
and no consideration of the evidence or the merits of the ob-
jections raised. The deci!:lion of the board was simply that 
it had nothing to decide, and it accordingly failed to function 
as an equalization tribunal. In the light of its mistaken un-
derRtanding as to the factual background of the applications 
before it for appropriate disposition, the consequences of the 
boards omission to act upon the evidence presented were just 
as disastrous to the plaintiffs' cases as would have been the 
board's refusal to take jurisdiction of the proceedings or to 
accord the plaintiffs a hearing. 
But the mistake of the board in the respect noted does not 
sanction the court's undertaking to resolve the conflicting 
issues of fact bearing upon the taxable value of the plaintiffs' 
leasehold interests. [6] As appears from the numerous au-
thorities cited in the forepart of this opinion, the respective 
county board of equalization is the fact-finding body desig-
nated by law to remedy excessive asses.~ments (Cal. Const., 
art. XIII, § 9). and when that tribunal, after due hearing 
and within the limits of reasonable discretion, makes its find-
ings on the facts, such decision is final and conclu.sive. The 
present cases involve a dispute as to the proper method of 
asses..sment of plaintiff!!' property interests, there was a con-
fiiet in the evidence on that iR.~ue as presented to the board, 
and that tribunal should decide the merits or demerits of the 
complaint before it. It is essential to the performance of 
governmental functions that an orderly system of assessment 
and collection of taxes shall be maintained, and that the 
amounts of the assessments be fixed with certainty in a pre-
scribed manner. The prevailing statutory scheme in this state 
on equalization matters proyide.'l for a method of reviewin~ 
the valUeR fixed by the assessor and a tribunal to pass upon 
any claims of overvaluation. (Rev. & Tax Code, § 1601 et 
seq.). [7a] While conRiderations of procedural due proces.~ 
here nullify the force of the authorized trihunal's ruling and 
sustain its avoidance by the court in response to the plaintiffs' 
applications for relief therefrom, the intent of the law govern-
ing equalization proceeding!! would require that these ~ 
be remanded to the board for completion upon the basis of 
the evidence submitted at the hearing before it. [8] True, 
the life of 11 board of equalization is limited by statute (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 1603), but that provision is directory only 
) 
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and does not deflect from the statutory scheme that the au-
thorized tribunal pass upon matters properly within its juris-
diction though in the completion of its work it must act at a 
time beyond the prescribed period. (Buswell v. Board of 
Supervisors of Alameda County, 116 Cal. 351, 354 [48 P. 
226]; Whiting Finance Co. v. Hopkins, 199 Cal. 428, 436 [249 
P.853].) [7b] While in the case of Bandini Estate Co. v. 
Los Angeles County, supra, upon establishment of the in-
validity of the equalization proceeding by reason of defects 
in the composition of the board and in the conduct of the 
hearing amounting to a lack of procedural due process. "it 
[was] ordered that the judgment [against the taxpayer] be 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court to ascer-
tain the proper values of the various parcels in question, and 
determine the amount of the taxes due thereon" (28 Cal.App. 
2d 232]. it does not appear from the opinion, with but such 
passing treatment of the point, that the question of the proper 
tribunal to which valuation issues for purposes of assessment 
should first be submitted was there rai!'!ed or received con-
sidered judgment. In so far as the quoted language is contrary 
to the views herein expressed, it must be disapproved. 
The foregoing discussion renders it unnecessary to consider 
other propositions presented on these appeaL; relative to the 
conduct of the trial incident to the court's determination of 
the meritl-. of plaintiffs' equalization claims. 
The .iudgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to remand these matters to the Los Angeles County Board of 
Equalization for further consideration and action in accord-
ance with due process of law. It is also ordered that the money 
placed on depo!'!it herein by the plaintiffs as representative of 
their tax liability under the assessed valuations of their prop-
erty interests and as a condition of their application for equi-
table relief, be retained by the court pending the determina-
tion of these equalization matters by t.he board. While on 
this point the present cases present a peculiar question of 
procedure. "There is nothing particularly unusual or con-
trary to good practice for the court in the exercise of it!'! 
equity powen; to retaIn jurisdiction of the parties and the 
subject matter of the action, when thE' circumstanc~ of the 
case warrant the !'lame. until the appropriate remedy may be 
finally accorded by the jlld~ment in the action" Olurp71'1 v. 
Bucke's Depa1'tment Store, 199 Cal. 194, 198 [248 P. 668]), 
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and upon analogous reasoning a like principle should pre-
vail here to assure justice to all partieR concerned. Accord-
ingly, the final disposition of these cases must await the board's 
ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims and the court's 
disbursement of the fund on deposit herein in conformity 
with the terms thereof. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Edmonds, J., concurred. Carter, J., 
concurred in the judgment of reversal. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and DissentiDg.-I concur in 
the first six paragraphs of the majority opinion and in the 
conclusion that a taxpayer has no right to a trial de novo 
in the superior court to resolve the conflicting issues of fact 88 
to the taxable value of his property. In my opinion, however, 
the record of the board of equalization proceedings discloses 
nothing to indicate that plaintiffs were denied due procesll 
of law. 
In their complaint to the county board of equalization 
plaintiffs contended that the assessments of their propertie.<l 
were excessive because the assessor had used a discriminatory 
method of determining value. On July 18, 1940. they hail 
a hearing before three members of the board of equalization. 
Their expert testified that the as.'Ie.~ed value should have 
been arrived at by a volumetric method applied on an acrl>age 
basis. The assessor's method W8Jo1 based on production \'l\.lue 
of existing wells. which was explained by his oil vahllltion 
engineer. The board of equalization accepted the lat.ter's 
testimony and denied relief to plaintiffs. Constnlctive fraud 
cannot be predicated on that acceptance. Los Angeles etc. 
Co. v. Countll of Los Angeles. 162 Cal. 164. 169-170 [121 P. 
384. 9 A.L.R. 1277]; Birch v. County of Ora.nge. 186 Cal. 
736, 741 r200 P. 6471.) 
The majority opinion is based. not on what occurred at 
the hearing on July 18th. but on what occurred when the 
matters came up for deeiRion at the fonnal meeting of the 
board of August 1. 1940. Equalization m8ttersin LOR An-. 
geleR County are cuRtomarily hearo bv three boaro members. 
different groups of three Ritting on different days. Many caseR 
are taken undl'r RubmiRRion and called up for decision when 
all five members of the board are preRent AO that all Rl1bmitted 
matteI'R ready for decillion can be pRMl'd upon at one timt'!. 
If a fourth or fifth member should vote upon an application 
) 
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that he did not hear, hi!l vote must be disregarded, but that 
would not invalidate the proceeding. The transcript of the 
board proceedings shows that when the two applications in 
these cases were called upfoI' decision, there were two other 
applications involving other oil propertie.o: heard by different 
board members, one of whom was Supervisor Smith. The 
record disclose!: that he made no remark!l designed to influ-
ence the three board members who heard the evidence in the 
present eases and voted to deny the applications. 
There was nothing improper in the attendance at the board 
meeting of the deputy county counsel who represented the 
assessor. The record discloses that he did nothing to influence 
the vote of any member of the board. 
There is no~ merit in the contention that the board inten-
tionally withheld any judgment for the purpose of submit-
ting the matter later in court. According to the record Su-
pervisor McDonough was simply not convinced that plaintiff's 
property had been improperly asse..'1sed and was of the opinion 
that whatever remedy the taxpayer might have muRt be 
through the courts. Even if his reasoning was erroneous, and 
the decision in which he joined was based on it. the decision 
would not violate due proce.'I!l any more than would an errone-
ous judgment of any court. (Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306. 317 
[265 P. 246] j Patterson v. Oolorado, 205 U.S. 454. 461 f27 
S.Ct. 556. 51 L.Ed. 879]; _4bbott v. National Bank of Oom-
merce, 175 U.S. 409. 414 [20 8.Ct. 153, 44 L.Ed. 217]; Jones 
v. Buffalo Oreek etc. 00., 245 U.S. 328. 329 f38 S.Ct. 121. 62 
L.Ed. 325]; Oentral Land 00. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103. 110. 
112 f16 S.Ct. 80, 40 L.Ed. 91] : Worcester Oounty Trust 00. 
v. R,aey, 302 U.S. 292, 299 [58 S.Ct. 185. 82 L.Ed. 268].) 
The majority opinion declare..'1 that "while three of the 
board members, as above noted. had heard extensive testimony 
as to ·the valuation bases with respect to plaintiffs' leases. they 
did not correlate this prior hearing of factual evidence with 
plaintiffs'applieations." There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the three memben; who heard the evidence did 
not correlate it with the plaintiff~' applications. Havinp: no 
special insight into the mental processes of the board members 
this court cannot determine that they failed to correlate plain. 
tiffs' applications and the evidence heard in the previous hear-
ing. Indeed, the presumption ill that they did. (Utah Oon-
"ruction. Co. v. Richarcl8on, 187 Cal. 649, 654 [203 P. 401]; 
) 
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Sauings& Loan Soc. v. San Francisco, ]46 Cal. 673, 678 [80 
P. l08G]; J[annon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251, 267 [5 P.2d 4]; 
Wild Goose COllntry Club v.County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 
339, 342 [212 P. 711]; Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 
Cal.App. 473, 478 [284 P. 1072]; Great Nodhern R. R. Co: 
v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 [56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532, 5361.} 
It must therefore be concluded that the evidence failed to 
convince them that the asse~sments were improper. There ill. 
no requirement that the board members give written opinions 
in the cases before them or set forth orally the mental proc-
esses that prompted their conclusions. Indeed, there can be 
no inquiry into 'those processes to unpeach their decision. 
(Chicago B. & O. Ry. Co. v.Babcock. 204 U.S. 585, 593 [27 
S.Ct. 326, 51 L.Ed. 636].) Nor can their written or oral 
expression of opinion be used for that purpose. "To hold that 
oral or written opinions or expressions of judges of trial courts 
may be resorted to to overturn judgments would be to open 
the door to mischievous and vexatious practices." (De Cou 
v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 751 [214 P. 444].) 
Moreover, the decision of the board was made by three 
members. Only one member's expre.'!Sion of opinion is at-
tacked. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
lilajority shared his view. The prevailing opinion states that 
"Supervisors Jessup and Hauge, in failing to deny any of 
the incorrect statements made incident to the adverse ruling 
upon the plaintiffs' applications, manifestly acquiesced therein 
upon the same erroneous premise." Supervisor McDonough 
was speaking for himself, and his statement was no more 
binding on the other members of the board than statements 
from the bench by one member of this court would be on the 
other members, in ruling on motions or during oral arguments. 
Each member may have his own reasons for his vote and may 
not only disagree with the statements of the others but inter-
pret them differently. Otherwise members of any judicial 
body would be constrained to deny aU statements of their 
colleagues with which they disagreed, and the consequence 
would be interminable hearings. 
There is no question in this case that plaintiffs had a fair 
hearing before an appropriate tribunal, as required by the 
due process clause. None of the charges is sufficient ground to 
set aside a judgment of a superior court or any other court. 
'!"here is no reason why they should suffice to set aside the 
) 
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decision of a quasi judicial body like the local board in this 
case. (See Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 
19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457].) 
